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Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
       Recently the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center and the Office of the Secretary Defense’s 2019 Missile Defense Review issued a report that concluded the same thing as a recent Defense Intelligence Agency which said “China [as well as Russia] is developing sophisticated on-orbit capabilities, such as satellite inspection and repair, at least some of which could also function as a weapon.”
       These recent reports as well as other earlier reports suggest that there are four ways that adversary counterspace capabilities could be mitigated. Unfortunately, even if all four of these suggested actions were implemented, they would not necessarily protect our constellations of SBIRSs and AEHFs during the 2020s.
       Diplomacy is the first line of defense. Hostile foreign nations are unlikely to be swayed by diplomatic approaches given the increasingly contentious international environment we currently find ourselves in.
       Dispersion of space assets would be a way to reduce their vulnerability. Unfortunately, even an accelerated schedule of launch and deployment would leave vulnerabilities in place for much of the 2020s.
        Rapid space reconstitution capabilities could replace damaged or destroyed military satellites but would be far too expensive and/or slow to quickly restore lost capabilities.
         Suppression of adversarial counterspace capabilities would be effective but should only be used as a last resort. The Mitchell/MITRE report said that “the DoD should formulate operational concepts to attack adversary counterspace assets such as launch facilities, space command and control nodes, ground-based anti-satellite laser facilities, and other related infrastructure.”
      Some analysts think that we should develop “bodyguard” satellites and send them up to rendezvous with and protect important U.S. satellites such as the SBIRSs and AEHFs. The proponents of these bodyguard satellites suggest that they should have the same capabilities as the “peaceful” maintenance satellites operated by the U.S. and possible enemies such as Russian and China. In addition to these bodyguard satellites there is a general consensus that the U.S. should continue to develop defensive weapons that could be carried by future versions of the SBIRSs and AEHFs. The development of such weaponry should be sensitive to the development of ASAT weapons by our potential enemies. It would not be a good idea to trigger another arms race in orbit.
       The bodyguard satellites would be able to block, disable or destroy an enemy ASAT as well as maintenance satellites if they were attacking U.S. orbital assets. The bodyguards would not even have to destroy the attacking enemy satelliteweapons. They could just render them inoperative by damaging antenna, engines, etc. This would reduce the amount of debris in orbit which would increase if the attacking weapons were blown up.
       In addition to directly engaging ASAT weapons, the bodyguards could protect satellites from ASAT attacks by releasing decoys in the path of the ASAT missiles, jamming their command, control and communication links or blinding their sensors.
       If there is a delay in the deployment of the next generation SBIRSs and AEHFs or if the new generation does not perform to expectations or new weapons systems are developed by potential enemies that could pose new threats to the SBIRSs and AEHFs, the U.S. would be well served by the bodyguard satellites providing an extra layer of protection for military satellites.